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ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
There are four issues argued in
brief,

Land Renewal Management

this appeal.

For ease 0f reading, throughout

Will be referred t0 as “Appellant

LRM”; Drake

this

Cazier

Will be referred to as “Appellant Cazier”; the Trustee of the Lola L. Cazier Revocable

Trust as “Respondent”; the Third

Amendment t0

the Lola

L

Cazier Revocable Trust as

“Third Trust Amendment”; The Lola L. Cazier Revocable Trust as “Trust”; and Lola L.
Cazier as “Grantor”.

ISSUE ONE: APPELLANT CAZIER’S CLAIM AGAINST THE TRUST
The
the Trust.

ﬁrst issue raised

The standard

by Respondent

for review

is

the cross—claim 0f Appellant Cazier against

0n appeal from summary judgment

This Court engages the same standard as the

is

as follows:

district court in

evaluating an appeal from an order granting summary judgment. Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, afﬁdavits, and discovery
documents on ﬁle With the court, read in a light most favorable t0 the
nonmoving party, demonstrate n0 material issue 0f fact such that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The burden 0f
proving the absence 0f material facts is upon the moving party. A11 disputed
facts are t0 be construed liberally in favor 0f the nonmoving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are t0 be drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party. If reasonable people might reach a different
conclusion from conﬂicting inferences based on the evidence then the
motion must be denied. If the evidence is conﬂicting on material issues or
supports conﬂicting inferences, 0r if reasonable minds could reach differing
conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Cramer v. Slater, 146
Idaho 868, 873, 204 P.3d 508, 513 (2009) (internal cites omitted).

Respondent’s Brief requests the court apply a different standard. However, Respondent’s
requested standard

is

inapplicable in this matter.

The standard of review

set forth

by Respondent

in analyzing Appellant Cazier’s

claim against the Trust focuses on a situation without a jury. See Respondent’s Brief, page
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9.

The standard

for a non-jury case

Although a quiet
Plaintiffs

at 32].

triable

title

action

is

is

simple and straight forward as the

0f right by a jury. This right

standard for

a party has requested a jury.

LRM’S Answer to

LRM speciﬁcally asked for a jury on all triable issues.

allowed t0 be dismissed, Appellant
trial

When

not heard by a jury, in Appellant

Complaint, Appellant

I.R.C.P. 38

inapplicable

is

is

inviolate. I.R.C.P. 38.

LRM’S

summary judgment

demand

is still

request

for jury if for

[R.

any issue

As Appellant LRM was

was never Withdrawn and thus

not

the jury

applicable on this appeal. I.R.C.P. 38(d).

The Idaho Supreme Court, when addressing a matter that included a

trust

interpretation, applied the following standard:

When this

Court reviews a

district court's grant

0f summary

same standard properly employed by the district court
judgment,
originally ruling 0n the motion. Summary judgment is proper if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on ﬁle, together With the afﬁdavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as t0 any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled t0 a judgment as a matter 0f law. The record is
construed in the light most favorable t0 the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor 0f that party. If reasonable minds
might come to different conclusions, summary judgment is inappropriate.
it

On appeal,

uses the

this

Family Trust

Court exercises free review. See Carl H. Christensen

v.

Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201

(1999) (internal cites omitted, trust discussion found in part C).
In this matter,

where a jury request was made and

as in past trust interpretation cases, the

Court should continue t0 apply the standard 0f review
correct standard, the District Court

Before proceeding further,

was
it is

set forth

in error to grant

by Appellant. Applying the

summary judgment.

important t0 disabuse the Respondent’s newly

raised procedural arguments in regards t0 the District Court’s erroneous decision

claim against the Trust.

First,

Respondent attempts

Idaho Code § 15-7-201. This argument

is

t0 address jurisdiction

incorrect as a matter 0f law.
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0n the

by invoking

The

District Court

did not dismiss 0n lack ofjurisdiction. The District Court dismissed Appellant Cazier’s

Cross Claim With prejudice for failure to
line 12-15. Jurisdiction

state a claim. [R. at 269], Tr. Transcr.

was not argued. Indeed,

Page 27,

as set forth in Appellants Brief,

by ﬁling

the action in Kootenai County, Respondent submitted itself t0 the jurisdiction of Idaho

Courts in accordance With I.R.C.P. 4.1(a).

There

is

also the

argument that Appellant Cazier referred to himself as a

Respondent’s Brief, page

12.

The

thrust 0f that

argument seems focused

creditor.

at labeling

Appellant Cazier as a “creditor” and thus not a sibling, so that the spendthrift portion 0f the
trust

blocks his claim. Inexplicably, in applying labels, Respondent

Appellant Cazier also stated that he

is

fails to

mention

that

a sibling and a beneﬁciary. Transcr page 18, line

20-24. Regardless of Whether Appellant Cazier labeled himself as a “creditor” such a label

would not change
in attempting to

beneﬁciary

is

his actual status as a “sibling.”

Respondent also

deﬁne Appellant Cazier. According

deﬁned

t0

fails t0

Idaho Code

§

mention the law

15-1-201(3) a

as:

Beneﬁciary, as

it

relates t0 trust beneﬁciaries, includes a

person

who

has

any present or future interest, vested 0r contingent, and also includes the
owner 0f an interest by assignment or other transfer and as it relates to a
charitable trust, includes

any person

entitled to enforce the trust.

Here, Appellant Cazier has a present interest 0r
present interest

is

Appellant Cazier

transfer,

a beneﬁciary by transfer. The

based on Kimberly Howard owing Appellant Cazier money.
is

transfer, a transfer

by

is

also a beneﬁciary as he

is

an owner 0f an interest by other

from Kimberly Howard’s portion. Whether a present

Appellant Cazier’s right

Kimberly Howard’s

is

to collect directly

from the Trust from

share.
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interest 0r

Respondent also

Appellant Cazier failed t0 establish that Kimberly

states that

Howard owed Appellant Cazier money. Respondent’s
allegation

is

directly contradicted

Appellant Cazier states

money owed.” At n0
money

“It’s

by

Brief,

Respondent’s

the record. In the Transcript page 19, line 4 and 5,

very clear in

my afﬁdavit that she

With

all

is

my sister and there is

is

Without merit 0r foundation.

Respondent’s ﬁnal argument, in regards t0 the Trust,
Respondent’s argument in regards

Howard owed

undisputed facts liberally construed in his favor, a

contrary statement in an appeal brief by Respondent

is

14.

point did Respondent contradict the fact that Kimberly

to Appellant Cazier.

argument

page

t0 interpretation

well outside 0f the failure t0

make

in regards t0 interpretation.

is

0f the Trust

is

surprising. This

a claim. Indeed, Respondent’s spendthrift

argument against Appellant Cazier’s claim against the Trust

is

conﬁrmation 0f

Respondent’s recognition 0f the claim. Furthermore, established case law

sets forth the

requirements that interpretation 0f an ambiguity in a trust cannot be resolved 0n

judgment. Carl H. Christensen Family Trust

v.

summary

Christensen, 133 Idaho 874, 993 P.2d

1197, 1204-1205. According t0 the Idaho Supreme Court trust interpretation proceeds as

follows:

Unless contrary to settled principles of law, the intentions of a
settlers

must control

in actions involving the trust.

attempts t0 determine a settlor's intent,

whole, considering

primary obj ective

document

in

its

is

When this

parts in light 0f the entire instrument.

is

The

Court's

0f the parties through Viewing the

When a document is

meaning

Court

construes a trust instrument as a

t0 discover the intent

entirety.

interpretation of its

document

all

is

it

trust's

clear

and unambiguous,

a question of law. In determining Whether a

ambiguous, the Court seeks t0 determine whether

it is

reasonably subject t0 conﬂicting interpretation. While a patent ambiguity
apparent on the face 0f the
is

an attempt to apply the

Christensen Family Trust

trust,

trust's
v.

a latent ambiguity

is

provisions t0 the existing facts. Carl H.

Christensen, 133 Idaho 874, 993 P.2d 1204

(internal cites omitted).
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is

not evident until there

Once a court determines that a document is ambiguous, interpretation of the
document presents a question 0f fact Which focuses upon the intent of the
This issue 0f the

parties.

resolved 0n

a question of fact, could not be

settlors' intent, as

summary judgment. Carl H. Christensen Family

Trust

v.

Christensen, 133 Idaho 874, 993 P.2d 1204-1205 (internal Cites omitted).
In the instant case, the District Court failed to analyze the Trust. This failure alone

necessitates a remand. Here, the Trust

therefore ambiguous.

The

subject t0 differing interpretations and

differing interpretations

Amendment which

the Third Trust

was

and resulting ambiguity revolve around

states:

The remaining undivided one-half interest

b.

is

(1/2) shall

be

KATHY DELL TRACY, MERRILL DEAN
CAZIER. MELANIE R. THOMPSON, and KIMBERLY D. HOWARD,
distributed in equal shares to

provided, however, that the share 0f KIMBERLY D.

reduced by any amounts she
death,

and said amounts

may owe her

shall

HOWARD shall be

siblings at time of Grantor's

be added to the share 0f the sibling 0r siblings

she owes. Grantor directs the Trustee t0 adjust the shares based on the

amount owed by
the loan

is

KIMBERLY D. HOWARD to her siblings regardless if

barred by the statute 0f limitations 0r

is

for

some other reason

is

legally enforceable.

Grantor
his children.

is

She

Drake Cazier or

intentionally leaving nothing to Charles

is

Monty Noel Cazier
gifted Monty Noel Cazier the sum 0f

also intentionally leaving nothing to

0r his children as she has previously

Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).
3.

In the event any 0f the beneﬁciaries

paragraph 2 above shall

fail to

named and

survive Grantor

by

designated in

thirty (30) days, then the

share of such deceased beneﬁciary shall be distributed equally t0 his or her
issue, per stirpes, except as set forth in

In applying the standard 0f review,

in light

most favorable

for the

Paragraph 5 below.

which requires

nonmoving party and

that all evidence t0

that all disputed facts are t0

construed liberally in favor 0f the nonmoving party, Appellant
directly

from the

Trust.

The Trust does not deﬁne

is

be

a sibling and can collect

sibling to exclude Appellant Cazier.

APPELLANTS’ RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
10

be construed

Interpretation 0f a

document requires the Court

ordinary meaning. Verska
(interpreting the language

v. St.

words

to give

their plain, usual,

and

Alphonsus, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (201

of statutes). The Trust also

states that

Grantor intentionally

nothing to Appellant Cazier. These are not mutually exclusive clauses as there

is

1)

left

no

contradiction between not leaving a speciﬁc share to Appellant Cazier, but allowing Cazier

t0 collect a portion

0f the Trust from Kimberly Howard’s share in his role as a sibling that

Kimberly Howard owes money

t0.

This right outlined in the Trust creates a situation where Kimberly Howard’s share

is

reduced and a

would be added

trust share

would be created and

t0 Appellant Cazier share.

Respondent’s arguments as

set forth

[R

at.

the

money owed by Kimberly Howard

76].

Yet these arguments, along With

0n page 14 0f his

brief,

focus on different

interpretations of the Trust. Different interpretations that create ambiguities

appropriate for resolution on

which

summary judgment. see Carl H. Christensen Family

are not

Trust

Christensen, 133 Idaho 874, 993 P.2d 1197, 1204-1205. Appellant acknowledges that

Respondent has a different interpretation 0f the clauses contained

Amendment.

Yet, the differing interpretations

demand

in the Third Trust

legal analysis, not dismissal

on

summary judgment.
Respondent also brings up the spendthrift clause

to argue against Appellant

Cazier’s claim t0 the Trust. Respondent’s invocation 0f the spendthrift clause

is

conﬁrmation 0f the legal basis of the claim brought by Appellant Cazier. After

a

all,

a

person would not assert a spendthrift clause defense against a non-existent claim. The
spendthrift provision again powerfully

interpretations.

The Trust reads

shows

that the Trust is subj ect t0 differing

that Appellant Cazier

can make a claim to Kimberly

APPELLANTS’ RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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v.

Howard’s share 0f the
51].

Trust. [R. at 76].

Where Grantor gave

also contains a spendthrift clause. [R. at

a speciﬁc right t0 the siblings 0f Kimberly Howard, this speciﬁc

allowance against Kimberly
true

The Trust

Howard supersedes

where the spendthrift clause appears

t0

the spendthrift clause. This

be boilerplate.

By the

Trust’s

especially

is

own

language,

Appellant Cazier can collect the claim he has against Kimberly Howard’s portion 0f the
Trust directly from the Trust.

With

all

disputed facts in his favor and

all

non-disputed facts liberally in his favor,

the District Court errored in not analyzing the Trust for different interpretations

establish ambiguity.

The Trust undoubtedly provides Appellant Cazier

against the Trust as he

is

the right t0 collect

a sibling 0f Kimberly Howard. Yet, Respondent’s

interpretation 0f the Trust language

is

Which

different than Appellant Cazier’s as

own

shown by

brieﬁng herein. The existence of two differing interpretations shows that the Trust

ambiguous. Where an ambiguity

v.

summary judgment. See Carl H. Christensen

Christensen, 133 Idaho 874, 993 P.2d 1204. Appellants request this Court

reverse the holding 0f the District Court and

ISSUE
The second

II:

remand

for further proceedings.

APPELLANT LRM’S DISMISSAL

issue involves the failure 0f the Court to dismiss Appellant

the litigation. This issue has been troubling in this matter.

issue can be

is

present, the interpretation of the Trust presents a

is

question of fact Which cannot be resolved 0n

Family Trust

the

summed up

in giving context to the

page 6 0f the Respondent’s

Brief.

LRM from

The troubling nature of this

assignment spoken of by Respondent 0n

Respondent aggressively stated while discussing

disclaimers 0f interest that “Rather,

LRM further complicated the cloud 0n title through the

assignment referenced in the Appellant’s Brief, which was wholly self—serving assignment
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executed by Drake Cazier as
the Afﬁdavit 0f Kurt

CEO 0f LRM t0 himself.” Respondent’s Brief, page 6. Yet,

Schwab shows

this statement t0

be Wildly incorrect.

the Record, in the Afﬁdavit 0f Kurt Schwab, the assignment

with Respondent as a method 0f having Appellant

assignment was not self—serving,
Appellant

it

On page 214

0f

was speciﬁcally discussed

LRM dismissed from the case.

was a method discussed With Respondent

to

The

show

that

LRM had no interest in the matter and could be dismissed from the case.

Although paragraph 12

is

show the context 0f why

in dispute in regards t0

was

the assignment

misconstrued, Where there

is

an evidentiary ﬁnding, other paragraphs

created.

The assignment should not be

information on ﬁle establishing

how the

assignment came to

be.

The

rest

0f the Respondent’s argument in regards t0 the dismissal of LRM are

already addressed in Appellant’s Opening Brief and Will be quickly consolidated here.

Appellant

LRM was not required t0 allow a default against itself.

not mandatory, nor

is it

is

the only legal procedure available to a defendant to exit a case.

Appellant requested Respondent release Appellant

Respondent refused.

Idaho Code §6-402

[R. at 114-1 15]. Appellant

LRM from the case.

[R. at 114-1 15].

LRM tried t0 disclaim the property in an

assignment, which assignment was discussed with Respondent. [R. at 114-1 15]. Again,

Appellant

LRM’S

then stated

it

request t0 be dismissed

had no

interest

and requested

accordance with I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). [R.

summary judgment

clearly

showed

requested dismissal. Appellant

was

was refused by Respondent. Appellant

at

that

it

t0

LRM

be dismissed in summary judgment in

134-138]. Appellant

was not seeking an

LRM’s

response in

interest in the property

and

LRM was not defending frivolously as Appellant’s defense

the continual request 0f dismissal.

It

was not unreasonable

for Appellant
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3

LRM to

request dismissal. Finally,

had the

right t0 include

allow Appellant

LRM has as much foundation t0 defend the suit as Respondent

an unnecessary party. The District Court errored When

it

did not

LRM to be dismissed.

ISSUE

III:

ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

Respondent discussed the evidentiary

issues, Without addressing the

law cited 0r

the argument presented. Respondent failed t0 address the arguments raised in regards to

the Afﬁdavit of Kurt Schwab. First, the Court abused

its

discretion

by

failing t0 allow the

Afﬁdavit of Kurt Schwab based 0n I.R.E. 803(24). Respondent failed t0 address 0r
analyze I.R.E. 803(24). This failure was an abuse of discretion based 0n failure t0 follow
I.R.E 803(24).

The

failure robs Appellants the right t0 bring evidence t0

prove

Why the

attorney fees should not have been granted in this matter.

Next, Respondent cited an Idaho case in regards t0 the standard for attorney fees.

However, the case

cited did not address

any part 0f the argument

54(e)(6) and the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Respondent
fees

in regards to attorney fees will

and costs section

set forth

in accordance with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6).

I.R.E.

The caselaw presented by

be addressed in greater depth in the attorney

below.

Respondent did not address the

evidentiary hearing

in regards t0 I.R.C.P.

failure

of the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing

The Idaho Rules of Evidence apply

Which require Witnesses and documents

603 and I.R.E. 803. Yet, the Court failed

t0

t0 the

be in compliance With

to apply the I.R.E. to the evidentiary

hearing in regards t0 attorney fees in this matter. The failure t0 apply the rules to

all

parties substantially effects the right

0f Appellants t0 present facts in opposition to the

requested attorney fees. Appellant

not asking the Court to second guess the District

is
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Court’s failure t0 follow the law. Appellant

Law can be

followed.

ISSUE
Respondent

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

IV:

cites to several cases

an award of attorney
for

requesting this matter be remanded s0 Idaho

is

Respondent

fees,

awards of attorney fees and

costs.

which

will

now be

addressed. First, In regards t0

an Idaho Case Which discussed the standard

cites to

Idaho Military Historical Soc ’y,

Inc.

Maslen, 156

v.

Idaho 624, 633, 329 P.3d 1072, 1081 (2014). In that case the Supreme Court clariﬁed that
the judicial standard for granting attorney fees includes the ability for the court t0

apportion fees

the

same

when an

ruling, the

action contains both frivolous and

Supreme Court reiterated

arguments that are based 0n a good
omitted).

T0 be

sure,

it is

argument.”

was not

Claim automatically results in attorney fees n0 matter
present. Indeed, the Court in the

Id. at

In

faith legal claims. Id.

that “Attorney fees will not

faith legal

clear that the Court

good

be awarded for

1081 (internal cites

creating a standard

how many good

Idaho Military Historical Soc ’y,

Inc.

where a frivolous

faith claims are

(IMHS) declined

award attorney fees on the appeal.

Id. at 1081.

change the Appellants’ objections

t0 the attorney fees, but rather bolsters Appellants’

to

In this matter, the cited case law does not

requests for redress in this matter.

Appellant has already included in this appeal that the District Court was wrong for
failure to apportion attorney fees.

Apportionment 0f legal fees was requested

Appellants’ opening brief 0n page 27-32, and continues t0 be requested
attorney fees are awarded.

instant case

that

It is

also

worth discussing the different

and IMHS. In IMHS, Holbrook Malsen,

were indefensible,

legal theories

in

by Appellant

facts

initiated a case that

if

between the

had

factual claims

he could not prove, and unsupportable claims that
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5

any

were known

to

be unsupportable.

That

Id. at 1080.

is

not the situation in the instant case.

Here, Appellants did not bring this action. They defended this action.

Second, Respondent correctly

cites to

Smith v Treasure Valley Seed C0., LLC, 161

Idaho 107, 383 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2016). The Court in Smith held that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2)
requires written ﬁndings

when determining whether an award 0f attorney’s

fees is

appropriate, but that the absence 0f written ﬁndings does not constitute reversible error. Id.

However, the Court
record so

it

in Smith

still

held that a writing requirement serves t0 create a clear

might be determined Whether the court applied

t0 property

law

t0 appropriate

facts.

Smith v Treasure Valley Seed C0., LLC, 161 Idaho 104, 383 P.3d 1280. According

t0 the

Court in Smith, the writing requirement can be met With a Transcript.

1281.

The Court then held

that “.

constitute reversible error because

..

it

Id.

383 P.3d

the absence 0f written ﬁndings in this case does not

does not affect Vernon’s substantial rights.”

Id.

383

P.3d 1281. The clear language 0f the holding provides that the failure t0 provide a written

ﬁnding could constitute a reversable error due

t0 affecting substantial rights, like the right

to appeal.

In this case, the failure t0 have a written ﬁnding affected substantial rights of

Appellants to appeal a decision Which lacked basis and reason as required by I.R.C.P.
54(e)(2). This writing

forth in law,

account.

ﬁnding

Which standards

failure also failed t0 take into

start

account standards already set

With taking the entire course of the litigation into

Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho

282, 289-90, 246 P.3d 391, 398-99 (2010). Next,

attorney fees will not be award for arguments that are based

argument. Idaho Military Historical Soc ’y, Inc.

v.

0n a good

faith legal

Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 633, 329 P.3d

1072, 1081 (2014). Finally, the writing must create a clear record so that
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it

might be

determined whether the

v.

trial

court applied the property law to the appropriate facts. Smith

Treasure Valley Seed Ca, LLC, 161 Idaho 104, 383 P.3d 1280. Here, the Transcript,

Orders, and Judgments

Looking

all fail to satisfy

the requirements of Idaho

at the transcript, there is

n0 reasoning or basis

N0

Appellant Cazier’s claim against the Trust.

and no

basis.

The only ground provided on

counterclaim as appropriate, that
leave

it

at that.” Tr. Transcr.

it

Law.

for the dismissal

case law, no rule, n0 statute, no analysis,

the transcript

is

that “I

ﬁnd

the dismissal 0f the

doesn’t state a cause 0f action against the

Page 27,

0f

line 12-15.

Even

if the

trust. I’ll

Court accepts “failure t0

state

a claim” as the basis, the rule requires more; the rule requires the basis and reasons. See

Lee

v.

Nickerson, 146 Idaho

5, 10,

189 P.3d 467, 474 (2008); see I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2).

Moreover, the basis and reasons for Appellant

LRM’S request t0 be

accordance with I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) are also

out entirely.

this case also

left

dismissed in

The lack 0f basis or reason

blocks the ability for this Court t0 determine Whether the

trial

court applied

the proper law t0 the appropriate facts. Here, the failure to provide a writing,

include the statements

Where

made 0n the

record, d0 not

in

which

meet the requirements 0f Idaho Law.

the requirements were not met, and affect substantial rights, require that

award of

attorney fees be vacated and remanded.

Finally,

Respondent addresses the issue 0f attorney fees based on the unlawful

practice of law. Respondent’s argument

is

made without

the use 0f statute 0r case law. In

applying Idaho Law, the attorney fees of M. Patton Echols should not have been granted.
First, the entire

Afﬁdavit

is

Patton Echols was hearsay,

hearsay according t0 I.R.E. 803.

it

Where

the Afﬁdavit 0f M.

should not have been considered in establishing attorney
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fees.

Second, Attorney fees should not be granted as the Afﬁdavit of M. Patton Echols

shows Violations of Idaho Code

§ 3-420.

Idaho Code § 3-420 forbids the unauthorized practice of law.

Idaho Code

§

3-420

states as follows:

If any person shall, Without

having become duly admitted and

licensed t0 practice law Within this state 0r
therein shall have terminated either

pay

whose

right 0r license t0 practice

by disbarment, suspension, failure to

his license 0r otherwise, practice 0r

assume

t0 act or

hold himself out t0

0n the

the public as a person qualiﬁed to practice 0r carry

calling

0f a

be guilty 0f an offense under this act, and
t0 exceed ﬁve hundred dollars ($500), 0r
be imprisoned for a period 0f not t0 exceed six (6) months, 0r both, and if
lawyer Within

this state,

he

shall

0n conviction thereof be ﬁned not

he shall have been admitted t0 practice law he shall in addition be subj ect to
suspension under the proceedings provided by this

The Idaho Supreme Court has

further clariﬁed that

act.

Idaho Code § 3-420.

“The practice 0f law has been deﬁned

as doing or performing services in a court ofjustice, in

any

matter... in a larger sense,

it

includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation 0f instruments and contracts through

Which

legal rights are secured...." Citibank (South Dakota),

NA.

v.

Carroll, 148 Idaho 254,

220 P.3d 1073, 1079 (2009).
Attorney fees should not be granted on the bases of a Violation of Idaho Law.
outlined in the Appellants’ Brief,

[R. at 196.]

M.

M. Patton Echols contacted Appellant Cazier by phone.

Patton Echols then sent an offer letter to Appellant Cazier. [R. at 196.] The

preparation 0f the offer letter

rights

As

were being secured

contradict that an offer

was

the preparation of an instrument through

for the client of M. Patton Echols.

was made. Indeed, according

t0

M.

No

facts

1.3 hours. [R. at 196].

Patton Echols Afﬁdavit,

8

M. Patton

These discussions about the offer

APPELLANTS’ RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
1

legal

have presented to

Appellant Drake responded to the offer, Which response was discussed by

Echols with other individuals for

Which

in regards t0 the disputed property in Idaho,

fees

would focus 0n Idaho Law. The attorney

0f M. Patton Echols should not be granted and should be vacated.

Respondent requests attorney fees

arid costs pursuant to Idaho

I.A.R.41. These requests should be denied. In this matter, as set forth

Code §12-121 and
by Appellant,

this

appeal does not request a second guess as t0 the application of law, but requests the
District Court follow

and apply established law. Respondent also requests sanctions

according t0 I.A.R. 11.2. This request should be denied as Appellants' arguments are

brought for a property putpose and grounded in fact and law.

CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully request that this Court overturn the judgment ofthe
District Court, vacate the attorney fees,

DATED this

and remand the case

for additional proceedings.

17th day 0f September, 20 1 9.

Post Falls

Law

KurtIL Schwab, Attorney for Appellants.
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HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
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served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following:

D U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
D Court Box
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile
Service
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Randall C. Probasco
Post Ofﬁce

Box 3641
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Telephone: (208) 930-0875
randall@rplawcda.com
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Kurt Schwab
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